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COMMENTS
"REGULATION" OF BUSINESS BY LABOR:
Union's Right to Organize Reluctant Employees
By FRrmici E. JoNEs*
THE LABOR LAW, which governs the legal relations between
employer and employee, is of as much concern to the modern busi-
nessman as is the commercial law, which governs his dealings with
customers. In either case the rights of the parties must be ascertain-
able. Recent California Supreme Court decisions have created uncer-
tainty in California labor law as to the rights of organized labor in
the business community. Prior to 1958 labor unions enjoyed substan-
tial freedom in their efforts to extend their membership. Garmon v.
San Diego Building Trades Council' decided in 1958 restricted labor
union efforts to organize nonunion workers who had not solicited
union membership representation. The change begun in this case
was extended by the dictum in Chavez v. Sargent2 decided in 1959.
Less than nine months later, both cases were overruled by Petri
Cleaners Inc. v. Automotive Employees Unions and the court reestab-
lished in California the labor policies which prevailed prior to Gar-
mon. The overruling of these cases so soon after they were decided
has caused uncertainty in labor-management relations in California.
The latest supreme court pronouncement of California's labor policy
is Messner v. Journeymen Barbers Union4 where the Petri case was
approved and the court stated that any major changes in California
labor law must come from the legislature, not the courts.3
The Messner Case
Using the Messner case as a basis, this discussion will set forth
certain rights of organized labor in the business community, the foun-
dation upon which the rights are based, and the restriction of the
rights that was attempted. (Inasmuch as the cases giving rise to this
discussion had their effect on California labor law only, the federal
law, applicable when interstate commerce is involved, will not be
considered.)
In the Messner case the plaintiff was the owner of a barber shop
and had four barber employees. None of the employees were union
members and none desired to join the union. The defendant labor
* Member, Second Year class.
'49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
252 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
3 53 Cal. 2d 455,349 P.2d 76,2 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1960).
4 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
5 Id. at 882, 351 P.2d at 353, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
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union requested plaintiff to sign a contract with the union, which
would have required plaintiff, who worked in the shop, and his em-
ployees to join the union. Peaceful picketing of plaintiff's premises
began when he refused to sign the contract. Plaintiff sought an in-
junction against the picketing and was successful in the trial court.
On appeal the California Supreme Court reversed and held that a
closed or union shop contract was a proper labor objective even though
the union did not represent any of the employees directly involved,
that peaceful picketing to achieve this goal was lawful, and that such
activity could not properly be enjoined.
This holding of the court was based on the case law prior to Gar-
mon and the Labor Code sections 920-23 as interpreted by those cases.
The court stated:6
Thus, for fifty years, until the four-to-three decision of this Court
in Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595,
320 P.2d 473, in 1958, it was the settled law of this state that union
labor could freely compete for jobs in the labor market and seek to
improve wages and working conditions by engaging in lawful con-
certed activities such as strikes and picketing. The law moreover
recognized that union labor has a legitimate interest in organizing
workmen in competing nonunion shops to insure the benefits of col-
lective bargaining in union shops. Concerted activities to achieve
that goal were legitimate even when the employees in the nonunion
shops did not wish to join or be represented by the union.
This part of the Messner decision is the most important element, for
it is this area in which the confusion has arisen and which formed the
crux of the holdings in Garmon and Chavez.
Recognizing that other questions were involved which might arise
on remand the court stated that it was lawful for the union to require
the plaintiff employer-barber to become a member of the union be-
cause he was working in the trade and competing with organized
workmen in the trade. Under California law, if the employer-worker
is offered the same rights of membership as employee members, he is
subject to the same means of persuasion as any other worker, and this
includes peaceful picketing.7
Finally the court ruled that a clause in the proposed contract,
which would require the plaintiff to charge no less than the prices
specified for the services rendered in his shop, was not a violation of
the Cartwright Act,8 i.e., an unlawful restraint of trade through price
fixing, because its primary purpose was to establish the wages of
union members, which is recognized as a lawful labor objective.9
The primary purpose test, which was applied in determining the
6 Id. at 879, 351 P.2d at 351, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
7 Id. at 885, 351 P.2d at 354-55, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
8 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-758.
9 Supra note 4 at 886, 351 P.2d at 355, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 187-88.
legality of this alleged violation of the Cartwright Act, did not orig-
inate in the Messner case. In Overland Publishing Co. v. H. S. Crocker
Co.10 an agreement between a labor union and an employers' associa-
tion was held illegal as a restraint of trade. The union had agreed
that its members would only work for association members. The
court found that the primary purpose was to restrain competition,
and thus the agreement was illegal. The same test was applied in
Kold Kist Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters' in holding that a pro-
posed contract, which would have prevented the sale of prepackaged
frozen meat after the fresh meat counter had closed, was designed to
eliminate the competition of such products and was therefore in re-
straint of trade.
The Kold Kist case has been cited for the proposition that action
which is in restraint of trade is illegal regardless of the objective of
the parties and is also illegal if entered into for the purpose of re-
straining trade.' 2 The Overland case was used to support the state-
ment that the courts of California have held that the paramount
objective of the Cartwright Act is satisfied if the tendency of the ac-
tion or proposed action is to restrain trade . 8 Finally, it has been said
that if the purpose of the agreement is to restrict trade or the agree-
ment tends to restrict trade the agreement is against the objects of the
Cartwright Act.' 4
Admittedly agreements such as the one proposed in the Messner
case have a tendency to place some restraint on competition in trade.
As Justice Schauer points out in his dissent in Messner, if all the barber
shops in the area are organized under this contract, the price of barber
services will be just as fixed as if the employers had agreed among
themselves to eliminate competitive pricing.15 It would seem, how-
ever, that the true test when the question arises is the primary pur-
pose of the agreement.' 6 In cases where the main purpose is lawful
the courts have not held the agreement in restraint of trade merely
because its operation incidentally restricts trade.17
This aspect of the Messner decision cannot be entirely disregarded
for it raises many questions which are worthy of thorough investiga-
10 193 Cal. 109, 222 Pac. 812 (1922).
1199 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 P.2d 724 (1950).
12 Alpha Beta Food Markets v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal. App. 2d 343,
305 P.2d 163 (1956).
23 Kold Kist v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 P.2d 724
(1950).
14 People v. Sacramento Butchers Protective Ass'n, 12 Cal. App. 471, 107 Pac. 712
(1910).
15 Messner v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 907, 351 P.2d 347, 370,
4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 202 (1960).
16Schweizer v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 121 Cal. App. 2d 45, 262 P.2d 568
(1953).
1733 CAL. JuR. 2d Monopolies § 9 (1957).
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tion. Further consideration is not within the purview of this article.s
The problem to be discussed here is limited to the first issue decided
in Messner-the right of a union to picket even though it does not
represent the employees involved.
Historical Development
The fifty years of authority to which Justice Traynor referred, 19
and which forms the basis of California's labor law began in 1908 with
the case of Parkinson v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara Coun-
ty.20 In that case the union had submitted a union contract to the
plaintiff, which he refused to sign. The union declared a strike and
boycott of plaintiff's business. The court held that laboring men and
labor unions formed by them, if not bound by a contract to continue
work, could pledge themselves not to work for or handle materials
from an employer of nonunion men, so long as they used no unlawful
means. The court said, "Any injury to a lawful business, whether the
result of a conspiracy or not, is prima facia actionable, but may be
defended upon the ground that it is merely the result of a lawful ef-
fort of the defendants to promote their own welfare.."21
The court added that if the object sought and means used were
lawful, the motive inspiring the action was irrelevent. Thus the law-
fulness of the objective became the primary consideration in deter-
mining the legality of activity by laboring men acting in concert. The
following year the court decided Pierce v. Stablemens Union 2 2 and
again recognized the right of the union men to strike to attain lawful
ends, and to use moral intimidation to persuade others to strike or
refuse to do business with the employer involved. However, the pick-
eting in this case was enjoined because the court found it involved
force and threats of violence.
The decisions in these cases provided a basis for the rights of the
union to combine for the promotion of labor in the business commu-
nity. Though for a time there was some confusion as to the right of
labor to use the picket line 23 to attain its objectives, by 1921 the court
had established the right of the union not only to strike to attain its
ends but to use peaceful picketing as a means of advertising its griev-
ances with the employer and exerting pressure on him to accept the
18 See the following cases for treatment of this aspect of Messner v. Journeymen
Barbers Union, supra note 15: Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pac., 29 Cal.
2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946); Alfred M. Lewis v. Warehousemen, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771,
330 P.2d 53 (1958).
19 See text at note 6, supra.
20 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908).
21 Id. at 603-04, 98 Pac. at 1036.
22 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909).
23 See Moore v. Cooks Union, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417 (1919); Rosenberg
v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 39 Cal. App. 67, 177 Pac. 864 (1918).
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union demands. 24 The lawful objective test still controlled and the
court continued to hold that a man could refuse to work for another
or class of others and could agree with others to so refuse so long as
no unlawful objective is sought.25
Statutory Enactments
In 1933 the California legislature first enacted legislation intended
to establish the public policy of the state with respect to labor organ-
izations, 26 and to define certain contracts between labor and manage-
ment which were regarded as contrary to the public policy.27 These
statutes now appear as Labor Code sections 921 and 923. Labor Code
section 923 provides :28
In the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Negotiation of terms
and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement
between employer and employees. Governmental authority has per-
mitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate and
other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the
individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, it is nec-
essary that the individual workman have full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his choosing,
to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other material aid or protection.
In this statute the legislature not only recognizes the legality of
labor organizations but declares, in effect, that it is necessary that
labor organize to effectively bargain with employers. The declaration
is in line with the decisional law up to the time of its enactment.
Labor Code section 921 provides, in effect, that a promise by an
employee or prospective employee that he will belong to a labor or-
ganization, or will not belong to a labor organization, or will with-
draw from the employment relationship if he belongs to a labor organi-
zation is unenforceable as against public policy. The section also
applies to promises by the employer of the nature mentioned with
respect to employer organizations. These sections according to Shafer
24 See Lisse v. Local 31, Cooks Union, 2 Cal. 2d 312, 41 P.2d 314 (1935); Southern
Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron Workers, 186 Cal. 604, 200 Pac. 1
(1921).
25 Overland Publishing Co. v. Union Lithograph Co., 57 Cal. App. 366, 207 Pac.
412 (1922).
25 Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 566, § 1, p. 1478.
27id. §2.
28 Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 90, § 923, p. 208.
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v. Registered Pharmacists Union29 had been enacted to proscribe the
use of yellow-dog contracts in labor management relations 30
Growing Labor Power
Backed by the case law and a legislative pronouncement which
declared state policy to favor collective bargaining, labor organizations
increased their power. An essential element of effective collective
bargaining is the complete support of the employees involved in a
particular establishment or industry. The closed or union shop-a shop
in which only union members were employed-will effectively estab-
lish uniform support. Although the union shop was not a new idea,
in 1940 the California courts firmly established the legality of such
organization. That a closed shop was a proper labor objective, and
that peaceful picketing to attain that objective would not be enjoined,
were settled in the following cases.
In McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union,31 the nonunion
employees sought an injunction against the union picketing to attain
a closed shop. The court, affirming a denial of the injunction by the
trial court, and recognizing the legality of a closed shop, said: 3
2
The closed union shop is an important means of maintaining the
combined bargaining power of the workers. Moreover, advantages
secured through collective action redound to the benefit of all em-
ployees whether they are members of the union or not, and members
may resent nonmembers sharing in the benefits without liability for
the obligations. Hence a closed shop policy is of vital importance in
maintaining not only the bargaining power but also the membership
of trade unions.
Lund v. Auto Mechanics Union33 was substantially in accord.
Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union3 4 decided the same day as
McKay and Lund, held that Labor Code section 921 did not make
the closed shop unlawful in California. 5 The court reasoned that the
intent of the legislature must be considered in construing the statutes,
and that if it were determined that section 921 meant a promise to
join an independent union was unlawful, then that section would be
exactly contrary to section 923 which declares a policy favoring the
organization of labor for bargaining purposes.
In C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co., Ltd. v. Lyons30 the court
said, that there is no constitutional right to conduct a business as a
29 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P.2d 403 (1940).
30 Id. at 388, 106 P.2d at 407.
31 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940).
32 Id. at 326, 106 P.2d at 381-82.
33 16 Cal. 2d 374, 106 P.2d 408 (1940).
34 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P.2d 403 (1940).
35 Id. at 387, 106 P.2d at 407.
36 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d 414 (1940).
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nonunion shop.37 The court in upholding the right of the union to
picket to attain a closed shop contract stated the basis upon which
such a contract is warranted:38
The members of a labor organization may have a substantial in-
terest in the employment relations of an employer although none of
them is or ever has been employed by him. The reason for this is
that the employment relations of every employer affect the working
conditions and bargaining power of employees throughout the in-
dustry in which he competes. Hence, where union and nonunion
employees are engaged in a similar occupation and their respective
employers are engaged in trade competition one with another, the
efforts of the union to extend its membership into the employments
in which it has no foothold is not an unreasonable aim.
This statement by the court, while recognizing the closed shop as
a proper labor objective, goes further and indicates that such an ob-
jective can be pursued by a union which does not represent any of
the employees involved. It says ".... the efforts of the union to extend
its membership into the employments in which it has no foothold is
not an unreasonable aim." This is the precise issue raised in the Mess-
ner case, and was there also decided in favor of the union. None of
the employees in either case were members of the union and no dis-
pute existed between the employer and his employees. The court in
the Smith case said that the decisive question is whether the union is
demanding something reasonably related to employment and the pur-
poses of collective bargaining.3 9 As indicated the court concluded that
the objective was reasonably related to collective bargaining and that
it was lawful for the union to demand that the unwilling employees
become members of the union, and that the employer sign a union
shop contract which would require him to employ only union members.
In the Shafer ° case, the question of forcing unwilling employees
to join the union was also raised, although in that case some of the
employees were union members and the object of the union activities
was to secure a closed shop. It was contended that Labor Code section
921-23 forbade a contract under which the employer must force his
employees to join the union, for such action would be an interference
by the employers with the voluntary choice of a representative by the
employee, and would require that the employer exact a promise from
the employee that he would become a member of a labor organization.
The court rejected this contention and pointed out these sections of
the code were enacted as a result of the efforts of labor to secure its
371d. at 398, 106 P.2d at 419, citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council,
257 U.S. 184 (1921).
S8 Id. at 401, 106 P.2d at 421.
39 Id. at 400, 106 P.2d at 421.4 0 Note 34 supra.
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position and to combat anti-union ("yellow-dog") contracts and com-
pany unions, which were means devised by management to combat
the expansion of organized labor. The court stated that the California
Labor Code does not guarantee employees freedom from all interfer-
ence in selecting their collective bargaining agent, and does not place
restraints upon workers' efforts to secure closed shop contracts. 41
During the period following these cases the court continued to
follow the principles which had been declared in the decisions and
statutes as interpreted-that working men may organize to promote
their welfare and may use peaceful economic pressure against the em-
ployer to attain objectives reasonably related to labor conditions; that
the closed shop contract was such a proper objective; that the union-
men had a legitimate interest in the labor relations of nonunion
workers in the industry and could seek to unionize them even though
no dispute existed between them and their employer; and that such
activities were lawful and gave rise to no legally recognized compen-
sation for detriment to those resisting the demands.42
Reversal of Trend-The Garmon Case
In 1958 the court in Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Coun-
cil,48 on remand from the United States Supreme Court 44 granted
damages allegedly resulting from picketing by a labor union for the
purpose of coercing the employer to sign a union shop contract. Ac-
cording to the court the demand of the union was directly contrary
to the public policy of the state as declared in Labor Code section 923,
for the agreement would have required plaintiff to interfere with the
bargaining rights of employees, and coerce them as a condition of
employment to accept a representative not of their own choosing.45
The court concluded that this activity, in that it would have forced
employees to enter an unlawful contract within the meaning of Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1667, was itself unlawful activity giving
grounds for recovery of damages. An order for an injunction against
the picketing, which had been granted by the trial court, was reversed
because according to the California Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court had held the state court had no jurisdiction to give
equitable relief where the labor dispute substantially affects interstate
41 Note 34 supra at 388, 106 P.2d at 408.
42 Park & Tilford Import v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 595, 165
P.2d 891 (1946); Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146,
143 P.2d 20 (1943); Magill Bros. Inc. v. Building Service Employees Union, 20 Cal. 2d
506, 127 P.2d 542 (1942); Sontag Chain Stores v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 92, 113
P.2d 689 (1941); Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
43 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
44 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) (remanded
on issue of jurisdiction).
45 Note 43 supra at 607, 609, 320 P.2d at 480.
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commerce and is therefore within the cognizance of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act.46
The court then declared that the McKay47 case had been super-
seded by the Jurisdictional Strike Act,48 inasmuch as the dispute was
between the defendant union and the employee union formed by the
plaintiff, and declared that many of the other cases previously decided
in California had been superseded by legislative enactments and deci-
sional law. According to the Garmon case, it was contrary to the Cali-
fornia labor policies for a union to use economic pressure to obtain
from an employer a closed shop contract unless the employees involved
desired to join the union.
This holding was by way of dictum followed and extended in
1959, when the same court decided Chavez v. Sargent"9 and Retail
Clerks Union v. Superior Court.50 Chavez is distinguishable from Gar-
mon in that in Chavez both the employer and his employees desired to
join the defendant union and to have a closed shop contract but a
"right-to-work" ordinance in San Benito County prohibited it. The
court ruled the ordinance was invalid for the state had occupied the
field and the ordinance was contrary to the state labor policy.51 How-
ever, in arriving at this conclusion the reasoning of the court approved
the Garmon holding and attempted to further define the labor policies
of the state in accord with that decision.
The court held that the Jurisdictional Strike Act was applicable
when the employees involved did not want to join the demanding
union, for such a conflict of interest was a jurisdictional strike. In so
holding the court said: 52
Thus, any group of employees, organized or unorganized in the
formal, conventional sense, who are free of the proscribed employer
influence and who determined and informed their employer through
their authorized spokesman that they were unwilling to accede to the
demands of an organizer or unwanted union, and that they were sat-
isfied with the terms and conditions of their employment and wished
to continue in the established employee-employer relationship, would
thereby act as and constitute a "labor organization" within the mean-
ing of [Labor Code] sections 1117 and 1118.
It is important to notice that neither Garmon nor Chavez declared
that the closed shop was unlawful in California. In Chavez the court
said that a union must be the authorized representative of a majority
of the employees involved before it has the right to demand a closed
4661 STAT. 136-58 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
47 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940), discussed in text at notes 31-32, supra.
48 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-20.
4952 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959) (dictum).
50 52 Cal. 2d 222, 339 P.2d 839 (1959).
51 Supra note 49, at 213-14, 339 P.2d at 833.
52 Supra note 49, at 203, 339 P.2d at 826.
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shop contract. 53 Such a requirement was not recognized in California
prior to the Chavez and Garmon cases. Retail Clerks Union v. Superior
Court54 was decided the same day as Chavez and generally affirmed
the reasoning in that case.
Return to Prior Position-The Petri Case
In January 1960, the Garmon and Retail Clerks cases were over-
ruled, and the reasoning in Chavez disapproved by the California Su-
preme Court in Petri Cleaners Inc. v. Automotive Employees Union.55
The trial court had, based on the Jurisdictional Strike Act, granted
plaintiff an injunction against defendants picketing for recognition and
had denied a motion by defendant that plaintiff be compelled to bar-
gain with the defendant union instead of the "inside" union formed by
the employees. The supreme court found that the "inside" union had
been organized after the picketing began and that it had been aided
and interfered with by the employer, and it was therefore not a labor
organization within the meaning of section 1117 of the Labor Code.
The dispute was not between labor organizations within the meaning
of section 1118 of the Labor Code and was therefore improperly en-
joined as a jurisdictional dispute.
The trial court's refusal to grant defendant's motion to compel the
plaintiff to bargain with defendant union was affirmed. The court
ruled that the decision of the employer to bargain or not would be
determined by the free interaction of economic forces, and that com-
pulsory bargaining was not the law in California.50 The cases and the
interpretation of Labor Code sections 921-23 which had prevailed
prior to Garmon were reaffirmed, and the court said the Garmon de-
cision was directly contrary to the settled rule that labor has the right
to engage in concerted activity to attain a closed shop. 7 Turning to
the Chavez case the court said:58
... [T]his court departed from rules based on the free interaction of
economic forces and determined that collective bargaining must be
pursued or not according to the wishes of the majority of the em-
ployees directly involved . . . and . . . by going further and setting
up a new system of labor law based on majority rule instead of the
free interaction of economic forces, the case would turn our trial
courts into labor relations boards without legislative guidance or nec-
essary administrative machinery.
The conclusion in the Petri case was that closed shop contracts
are lawful in California, and that concerted activity to obtain them is
53 Supra note 49, at 212-13, 339 P.2d at 832-33.
.4 Supra note 50.
55 53 Cal. 2d 455, 349 P.2d 76, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1960).
56 Id. at 469, 349 P.2d at 85, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
5 Id. at 473, 349 P.2d at 87, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
58 Id. at 473-74, 349 P.2d at 88, 2 Cal Rptr. at 482.
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lawful whether the employees directly involved desire such agree-
ments. If the rule is to be changed the legislature must do it, not
the courts.
As was indicated at the outset, the case of Messner v. Journeymen
Barbers Union59 followed the Petri case, and held that the defendant
union could picket to coerce the plaintiff to sign a union shop agree-
ment and in turn require his employees to join defendant union. Two
cases have followed the Messner case and without detailed discussion
have adopted the same view as Messner and Petri.60
Conclusion
California courts have returned to the position of the half century
preceding the Garmon case by the reasoning in Petri, Messner, and
the cases following. No doubt the social and economic conditions exist-
ing at the time when Parkinson61 was decided and during the period
when sections 920-23 were enacted and interpreted have changed in
California as throughout the United States. Labor organizations have
struggled from a position of relative impotence in those earlier days
to the status of strong, effective, nation-wide organizations possessing
real power at the bargaining table. It may be that the modem labor
union has gained such a position of power relative to that of organized
business that the time has come for California to impose some restric-
tions on their power. If it is time for such a change the present ma-
jority in the California Supreme Court has made it clear in the Petri
and Messner cases that it must come from the legislature.
In the Messner case Justice Traynor gave the reasons of the court's
majority. Referring to the Petri decision he said: 62
Nevertheless . . . [the Petri opinion] felt bound to respect the
traditional principle of separation of powers that gives to the legisla-
ture the responsibility of making any major changes in social and eco-
nomic policy. It made clear that the court would not establish by
judicial legislation a little Taft-Hartley Act for California that only
the legislature can properly consider and enact. The legislature is
uniquely able to amass economic data and hold hearings where it
can give heed to many representatives of the public besides parties
to a controversy. It can best determine whether there should be
further governmental regulation of peaceful competitive economic
activity.
59 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal Rptr. 179 (1960). See discussion in text at
note 4, supra.
60 Bemis v. Beauticians Union, 184 Cal. App. 2d -, 7 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1960);
Laundromatic v. Laundry Workers Union, 180 Cal. App. 2d 854, 4 Cal. Rptr. 861
(1960).
61Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908). See
discussion in text at note 20, supra.
02 Messner v. Journeymen Barbers Union, supra note 59, at 882, 351 P.2d at 353, 4
Cal. Rptr. at 185.
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